Nov. 8, 2013, "Overt and Covert,‘The Brothers,’ by Stephen Kinzer," NY Times, Adam LeBor
"Anyone
wanting to know why the United States is hated across much of the world
need look no farther than this book. “The Brothers” is a riveting
chronicle of government-sanctioned murder, casual elimination of
“inconvenient” regimes, relentless prioritization of American corporate
interests and cynical arrogance on the part of two men who were once
among the most powerful in the world.
John
Foster Dulles and his brother, Allen, were scions of the American
establishment. Their grandfather John Watson Foster served as secretary
of state, as had their uncle Robert Lansing. Both brothers were lawyers,
partners in the immensely powerful firm of Sullivan and Cromwell,
whose New York offices were for decades an important link between big
business and American policy making.
John
Foster Dulles served as secretary of state from 1953 to 1959; his
brother ran the C.I.A. from 1953 to 1961. But their influence was felt
long before these official appointments. In his detailed,
well-constructed and highly readable book, Stephen Kinzer, formerly a
foreign correspondent for The New York Times and now a columnist for The
Guardian, shows how the brothers drove America’s interventionist
foreign policy.
Kinzer
highlights John Foster Dulles’s central role in channeling funds from
the United States to Nazi Germany in the 1930s. Indeed, his friendship
with Hjalmar Schacht, the Reichsbank president and Hitler’s minister of
economics, was crucial to the rebuilding of the German economy. Sullivan and Cromwell floated bonds for Krupp A. G., the arms manufacturer,
and also worked for I. G. Farben, the chemicals conglomerate that later
manufactured Zyklon B, the gas used to murder millions of Jews.
Of
course, the Dulles brothers’ law firm was hardly alone in its eagerness
to do business with the Nazis — many on Wall Street and numerous
American corporations, including Standard Oil and General Electric, had
“interests” in Berlin. And Allen Dulles at least had qualms about
operating in Nazi Germany, pushing through the closure of the Sullivan and Cromwell office there in 1935, a move his brother opposed.
Allen
Dulles spent much of World War II working for the Office of Strategic
Services, running the American intelligence operation out of the United
States Embassy in Bern, Switzerland. His shadowy networks extended
across Europe, and his assets included his old friend Thomas McKittrick,
the American president of the Bank for International Settlements in
Basel, a key point in the transnational money network that helped keep
Germany in business during the war.
The O.S.S. [Office of Strategic Services] was dissolved in 1945 by President Truman, but was soon reborn as the C.I.A. Kinzer notes that Truman did not support plots against foreign leaders but his successor, Dwight Eisenhower, had no such scruples. By 1953, with Allen Dulles running the C.I.A. and his brother in charge of the State Department, the interventionists’ dreams could come to fruition. Kinzer lists what he calls the “six monsters” that the Dulles brothers believed had to be brought down: Mohammed Mossadegh in Iran, Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala, Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam, Sukarno in Indonesia, Patrice Lumumba in the Congo and Fidel Castro in Cuba. Only two of these, Ho Chi Minh and Castro, were hard-core Communists. The rest were nationalist leaders seeking independence for their countries and a measure of control over their natural resources.
The O.S.S. [Office of Strategic Services] was dissolved in 1945 by President Truman, but was soon reborn as the C.I.A. Kinzer notes that Truman did not support plots against foreign leaders but his successor, Dwight Eisenhower, had no such scruples. By 1953, with Allen Dulles running the C.I.A. and his brother in charge of the State Department, the interventionists’ dreams could come to fruition. Kinzer lists what he calls the “six monsters” that the Dulles brothers believed had to be brought down: Mohammed Mossadegh in Iran, Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala, Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam, Sukarno in Indonesia, Patrice Lumumba in the Congo and Fidel Castro in Cuba. Only two of these, Ho Chi Minh and Castro, were hard-core Communists. The rest were nationalist leaders seeking independence for their countries and a measure of control over their natural resources.
Ironically,
Ho Chi Minh and Castro, strengthened perhaps by their Marxist faith,
proved the most resilient. But the world still lives with the
consequences of bringing down Mossadegh, who might have guided Iran, and
thus world history, along a very different path. The 1953
C.I.A.-sponsored coup that brought Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi to power
was seared into Iran’s national consciousness, fueling a reservoir of
fury that was released with the Islamic revolution of 1979.
The
Iranian section of Kinzer’s book is especially strong. Here he calls
attention to the cancellation by the Iranian Parliament of a contract
for what was said to be “the largest overseas development project in
modern history” with Overseas Consultants Inc., an American engineering
conglomerate. But it seems likely that it was the Iranian Parliament’s
vote to nationalize the oil industry that sealed Mossadegh’s fate.
(Allen Dulles represented the J. Henry Schroder Banking Corporation, one
of whose clients was the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.)
The
Dulles brothers’ defenders argue that they and their legacy must be
evaluated in the context of their era — the height of the Cold War, a
time when the Soviet threat was real and growing, when Eastern Europe
languished under Communist dictatorships sponsored by Moscow, and China
had been “lost” to the Reds (although that term itself implies a curious
claim of prior ownership). Moscow’s proxies were advancing in Africa,
Asia, Latin America and the Middle East.
The
brothers’ Manichaean worldview proved to be a poor tool for dealing
with the complexities of the postcolonial era. Leaders like Lumumba and
Mossadegh might well have been open to cooperation with the United
States, seeing it as a natural ally for enemies of colonialism. However,
for the Dulles brothers, and for much of the American government, threats to corporate interests were categorized as support for
communism. “For us,” John Foster Dulles once explained, “there are two
kinds of people in the world. There are those who are Christians and
support free enterprise, and there are the others.” Rejected by the
United States, the new leaders turned to Moscow.
The
brothers’ accomplishments in the geopolitical arena were not mirrored
in their personal lives. Although Allen Dulles was a flagrant womanizer
and John Foster remained devoted to his wife, they were, Kinzer
observes, “strikingly similar in their relationships with their
children. Both were distant, uncomfortable fathers.” John Foster’s three
children were raised by nannies “and discouraged from intruding on
their parents’ world.” Allen’s only son joined the Marines in a vain
effort to impress his father, who “never found him ‘tough’ enough.” He
was sent to Korea and almost died when shrapnel tore out part of his
skull. He spent years being treated for his wounds. Allen’s older
daughter suffered from depression throughout her life. Neither John
Foster nor Allen attended the wedding of their “independent-minded”
sister, Eleanor, when she married a divorced older man who came from an
Orthodox Jewish family....
Eventually,
the United States government tired of Allen Dulles’s schemes. President
Johnson privately complained that the C.I.A. had been running “a
goddamn Murder Inc. in the Caribbean,” an entirely accurate assessment—
except the beneficiaries were American corporations rather than
organized crime. Nowadays, the Dulles brothers have faded from America’s
collective memory. The bust of John Foster, once on view at the airport
west of Washington that bears his name, has been relocated to a private
conference room. Outside the world of intelligence aficionados, Allen
Dulles is little known. Yet both these men shaped our modern world and
America’s sense of its “exceptionalism.”
They should be remembered, Kinzer argues, precisely because of their failures: “They are us. We are them.”"
They should be remembered, Kinzer argues, precisely because of their failures: “They are us. We are them.”"
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