10/4/2018, “Yeltsin Shelled Russian Parliament 25 Years Ago, U.S. Praised “Superb Handling”,“ National Security Archives, George Washington University, Edited by Svetlana Savranskaya and Tom Blanton, Washington, DC
“Declassified [Pres. Bill] Clinton-[Boris] Yeltsin Telcons Show U.S. Support No Matter What”
“Twenty-five years ago [1993] last night in Moscow, Russian President Boris Yeltsin ordered tanks and airborne troops to shell and storm the “White House,” the Russian Parliament (Supreme Soviet) building, to suppress the opposition trying to remove him.
Declassified documents published today by the National Security Archive include the transcript of U.S. President Bill Clinton’s phone call to Yeltsin the next day to praise him, the memcon in which U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher subsequently told Yeltsin this was “superb handling,” and two State Department cables painting a more complex portrait of the causes of the events….
By the time the Clinton administration came to office in January 1993, the momentum of Russian reform was on the decline. Faced with severe consequences of market reform coupled with the effects of disintegration of economic ties after the dissolution of the USSR and the absence of any meaningful foreign economic assistance, Russia’s population and political elites began questioning the pace of the reform and the forceful methods of its implementation….
Rather than negotiating with the Parliament, Yeltsin habitually ruled by issuing Presidential Decrees. The opposition led by Vice President Alexander Rutskoy and Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Ruslan Khasbulatov was growing in the Parliament and in the regions, and blocking most of the president’s initiatives, which led to a paralysis of governing. The incoming U.S. [Bill Clinton] administration started its dialog with Russia in a state of virtual civil war between the executive and the legislature.
The declassified telcons and memcons of early Clinton-Yeltsin conversations show instant chemistry between the two leaders, genuine warmth and optimism and an incredibly rich agenda on which Russia and the United States agreed to cooperate (Document 2. See also EBB 640). Clinton mostly set the agenda, while Yeltsin, eager to build a genuine partnership with America, enthusiastically agreed to work together with him.
Clinton was deeply committed to Russia’s transformation into a democracy and market economy as well as to its full integration into the Western world….
Given this setting, Yeltsin, with his resume of a democratically elected Russian leader and a defender of democracy during the coup of 1991, seemed like an ideal partner who could deliver on all U.S. priorities. According to Strobe Talbott, some of Clinton’s advisers were concerned about Yeltsin’s unwillingness to consult and compromise with the Parliament and advised Clinton to focus on “principles and process,” not personalities. The president, however, was committed to Yeltsin as a personification of the revolutionary change and responded that this was “a zero-sum” thing.[2] This perception only intensified during Yeltsin’s final showdown with the Supreme Soviet in the final days of September 1993.
According to Ambassador Thomas Pickering, Yeltsin sent Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev to notify four key Western ambassadors about his intention to dissolve the Parliament and call for new elections (Document 4). In Clinton’s first phone call to Yeltsin immediately after the latter issued Decree 1400, dissolving Parliament and setting a date for early elections and a constitutional referendum, the U.S. president expressed his full support and accepted Yeltsin’s assurances that there would be no bloodshed and the reform would move faster now that there would be no obstacles. U.S. support for Yeltsin remained unwavering all through the confrontation and after the Russian President issued the order to storm the parliament (after initial violence on the part of the opposition).
On the morning of October 4, Muscovites awakened to the awful sight of the burning Parliament building—the [Russian] White House they had defended against the putsch in August 1991, where Yeltsin had stood on a tank and led the democratic forces. On October 5, the day after the bloodshed, Clinton called Yeltsin and congratulated him for his handling of the situation; he did not ask about the loss of life. Even stronger support was expressed by Secretary of State Warren Christopher, while visiting in mid-October, who practically lauded Yeltsin for his actions during the crisis. Documents show that the Clinton administration saw no alternatives to Yeltsin and was prepared to support him no matter what.
This situation grew out of the extreme personification of U.S.-Russia policy but also from the black-and-white picture the Yeltsin camp presented of the political situation in Russia, painting his opponents as “fascists” and unreformed communists. In fact, it was the same Supreme Soviet that was elected in the lauded free elections of 1990, that elected Yeltsin its chairman, and that granted him emergency powers to implement the radical economic reform in October 1991. As the year 1993 progressed and the political confrontation in Russia deepened, the U.S. administration dealt exclusively with the Yeltsin camp and came to regard the opposition as their Russian interlocutors presented them. But most importantly, the stakes were very high: Yeltsin was a good partner who was willing to play on U.S. terms, and any alternative—even democratically elected—was deemed unlikely to be as cooperative or reliable.
The Clinton administration was therefore highly invested in Yeltsin and, as Ambassador Pickering says he told Strobe Talbott, “you’ve got no other choice” than to support Yeltsin and hope that the December elections would be free and fair.
Not all actors on the U.S. side shared that opinion. Chargé d’Affaires James Collins’ cables show a more nuanced reading of the crisis and a deep concern about the fairness of the elections and the authoritarian potential of Yeltsin’s new Constitution, which Collins calls “half-baked.” (Document 7). The Pickering oral history also points to differences of opinion within the Embassy (Document 4). These disagreements did not seem to affect Clinton’s consistent support for Yeltsin’s handling of the opposition. U.S. backing remained constant after the disastrous [December 1993] election results in which Yeltsin’s party received only 15 percent of the vote and the Constitution barely passed the referendum. The system that emerged was essentially super-presidential, which did not worry most senior U.S. officials as long as a true democrat, in their view, held the post of president….Twenty-five years later, the controversy over the constitutional crisis of 1993 is not over and final judgments will have to await, among other things, the declassification of top-level Russian documents.”
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Among the recently declassified are Documents 03, 08, 09, and 11. Document 09 references US offering $12 million to support Yeltsin’s Dec. 1993 election and US intentions to expand NATO. Document 11 mentions Yeltsin’s flop in Dec. 1993 election:
9/21/1993: “Document 03
Memorandum of Telephone Conversation: Telcon with President Boris Yeltsin of Russian Federation.
1993-09-21
Source: U.S. Department of State declassification M-2006-01499
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Clinton
calls Yeltsin immediately after the Russian president makes a speech
announcing his Presidential Decree 1400-dissolving the Parliament and
setting the date for early elections to a new legislature and a
referendum for the draft Constitution. Clinton expresses
his full support for Yeltsin but also a concern about the fate of reform
and democratic process in Russia. In response, Yeltsin paints a
black-and-white picture of the political struggle saying that the
Supreme Soviet “has totally gone out of control. It no longer supports
the reform process. They have become communist.” He assures his U.S. partner that “there will be no bloodshed,” and that “all the democratic forces are supporting me.” Clinton
underscores the importance of holding the elections “in a fully
democratic manner,” and providing the opposition full access to free
press without hindrance. Yeltsin promises to stick to democratic principles and reiterates his commitment to peaceful solutions. Clinton mentions that a $2.5 billion assistance package is being considered by Congress at the moment and the preservation of democratic order would be important for its passing. Yeltsin promises that now the “reforms will go much faster” and thanks the U.S. president for his continuous support.”…
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“Document 08
Cable from American Embassy Moscow to Secretary of State: Your October 21-23 Visit to Moscow-Key Foreign Policy Issues
“Document 08
Cable from American Embassy Moscow to Secretary of State: Your October 21-23 Visit to Moscow-Key Foreign Policy Issues
1993-10-20
Source: U.S. Department of State. Date/Case ID: 04 MAY 2000 200000982
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In the follow-up to the previous cable (Document 6), [US Embassy] Chargé d’Affaires Collins reviews foreign policy issues Christopher is expected to cover in Moscow in his meetings with Yeltsin and Kozyrev and emphasizes that Yeltsin is looking for gestures of support from the United States. New elections are scheduled for December and Yeltsin needs all the support from the West he can get. Collins advises the secretary of state to be sensitive to Yeltsin’s and Kozyrev’s need for Russia to be seen domestically as a partner with whom the West consults and does not just take for granted, and he lists some controversial issues: NATO expansion, the post-Soviet space, and Ukraine. On NATO, Collins notes that the Russians are aware that the U.S. internal debate is reaching a crucial moment about expansion and they want to be assured that the door [to NATO] is open to Russia, not just to East Europeans. In Collins’ view, “what the Russians hope to hear from you is that NATO is not moving precipitously and that any policy NATO adopts will apply equally to them.” Their “neuralgic” attitude stems from the fear that they will “end up on the wrong side of a new division of Europe.” Therefore, Collins counsels Christopher to make sure the Russians know that the U.S. is actively promoting Russia’s “complete reintegration into the family of Western states.””
In the follow-up to the previous cable (Document 6), [US Embassy] Chargé d’Affaires Collins reviews foreign policy issues Christopher is expected to cover in Moscow in his meetings with Yeltsin and Kozyrev and emphasizes that Yeltsin is looking for gestures of support from the United States. New elections are scheduled for December and Yeltsin needs all the support from the West he can get. Collins advises the secretary of state to be sensitive to Yeltsin’s and Kozyrev’s need for Russia to be seen domestically as a partner with whom the West consults and does not just take for granted, and he lists some controversial issues: NATO expansion, the post-Soviet space, and Ukraine. On NATO, Collins notes that the Russians are aware that the U.S. internal debate is reaching a crucial moment about expansion and they want to be assured that the door [to NATO] is open to Russia, not just to East Europeans. In Collins’ view, “what the Russians hope to hear from you is that NATO is not moving precipitously and that any policy NATO adopts will apply equally to them.” Their “neuralgic” attitude stems from the fear that they will “end up on the wrong side of a new division of Europe.” Therefore, Collins counsels Christopher to make sure the Russians know that the U.S. is actively promoting Russia’s “complete reintegration into the family of Western states.””
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Oct. 1993, Document 09: US says it has $12 million to give Yeltsin in support of his upcoming Dec. 1993 election:
Oct. 1993, Document 09: US says it has $12 million to give Yeltsin in support of his upcoming Dec. 1993 election:
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Document 09 discusses US expansion of NATO and Russia’s wish to be a member:
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Excerpt re: NATO: “Christopher is very brief about the NATO discussion. He tells Kozyrev that the U.S. is sensitive to the Russian position and has developed a new proposal as a result: the Partnership for Peace (PFP), which would be open to all countries on an equal basis. Christopher does not directly address Kozyrev’s concern about the decision regarding expansion, but, misleadingly, lets it sound as if PFP is the alternative for the time being.“
Excerpt re: NATO: “Christopher is very brief about the NATO discussion. He tells Kozyrev that the U.S. is sensitive to the Russian position and has developed a new proposal as a result: the Partnership for Peace (PFP), which would be open to all countries on an equal basis. Christopher does not directly address Kozyrev’s concern about the decision regarding expansion, but, misleadingly, lets it sound as if PFP is the alternative for the time being.“
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“Document 09
Secretary Christopher’s Meeting with Foreign Minister Kozyrev: NATO, Elections, Regional Issues
“Document 09
Secretary Christopher’s Meeting with Foreign Minister Kozyrev: NATO, Elections, Regional Issues
1993-10-25
Source: U.S. Department of State. Date/Case ID: 11 MAR 2003 200001030
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On his trip to Europe to explain the U.S. position on NATO expansion, Secretary Christopher comes to Moscow after meetings in Budapest. He and special ambassador Strobe Talbott meet with Foreign Minister Kozyrev and his deputy, Yuri Mamedov,
before they visit Yeltsin at his country residence. Christopher raises
concerns about the fairness of the upcoming elections with his Russian
counterparts.
He mentions that the United States has $12 million to contribute and is
willing to send monitors or observers, which Kozyrev welcomes, saying they might help to guard against fraud by communist-leaning local authorities in rural areas where “the old kolkhoz mentality” still prevails. Christopher puts special emphasis on ensuring a free press since the order banning opposition newspapers was still not lifted. Kozyrev does not have a definitive answer to the question regarding banned newspapers and he says only six or seven political organizations will be banned from participating in the elections.
In this memo about the Kozyrev meeting, Christopher is very brief about the NATO discussion. He tells Kozyrev that the U.S.
is sensitive to the Russian position and has developed a new proposal
as a result: the Partnership for Peace (PFP), which would be open to all
countries on an equal basis. Christopher does not directly address Kozyrev’s concern about the decision regarding expansion, but, misleadingly, lets it sound as if PFP is the alternative for the time being.
The rest of the conversation deals with crucial issues on which the United States needs Russian cooperation, such as support for Eduard Shevardnadze in Georgia and the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Ukraine.”…
The rest of the conversation deals with crucial issues on which the United States needs Russian cooperation, such as support for Eduard Shevardnadze in Georgia and the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Ukraine.”…
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Document 11
Memorandum of Telephone Conversation: Telcon with President Boris Yeltsin of the Russian Federation.
Document 11
Memorandum of Telephone Conversation: Telcon with President Boris Yeltsin of the Russian Federation.
1993-12-22
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Source: William J. Clinton Presidential Library declassification 1015-0782-M-1
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Source: William J. Clinton Presidential Library declassification 1015-0782-M-1
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Clinton
calls Yeltsin to check on the political situation after the elections
and talk about his upcoming visit to Russia in January 1994. At the beginning of the conversation both presidents put the best spin on the disastrous election results where the nationalist Liberal Democratic Party of Vladimir Zhirinovsky finished with 23 percent, the Communist Party of Gennady Zyuganov with 12 percent and Yeltsin’s party, Russia’s Choice, headed by Yegor Gaidar, only got 15 percent. Clinton is concerned about Yeltsin’s ability to continue his economic reform with the strong nationalist-communist-agrarian opposition in Parliament.
Yeltsin assures him that he is committed to the reform and will be able
to work with the Parliament, “especially since the working relationship
is supported by a strong democratic foundation in the new
constitution.”… At the same time, he asks the U.S. president not to invite opposition party leaders to a meeting when Clinton comes to Moscow “so as not to give them an exaggerated opinion of themselves.” Clinton tells Yeltsin that they decided not to talk much about Zhirinovsky and “to play him down.”
The rest of the conversation focuses on preparations for the upcoming summit with Clinton’s three-part agenda:
“economic assistance to support your reforms; our common effort to
convince Ukraine to go non-nuclear; and our foreign policy agenda.” He promises to start a “quiet study” of how to increase IMF and World Bank assistance to Russia. Yeltsin is grateful for the support and emphasizes the importance of cooperation on denuclearization of Ukraine. He enthusiastically accepts Clinton’s program.”
Of note:
From 10/4/18 article at top of this post: After Yeltsin flop in December 1993 election:
"U.S. backing remained constant after the disastrous [December 1993] election results in which Yeltsin’s party received only 15 percent of the vote and the Constitution barely passed the referendum. The system that emerged was essentially super-presidential."...
Per Document 09:
US offered Yeltsin $12 million US tax dollars to support his Dec. 1993 election and provided election experts on the ground in Russia…..
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