“It is not tenable for politicians to now claim that they didn’t know what was happening. They constructed and enabled all of the policies that made this dangerous negligence possible. Nor is it credible to simply blame the medical profession. The widespread use of Hospital Trust gagging orders (non disclosure agreements) was also in place. Doctors who did speak out were disciplined or sacked.”
In 2020 as someone said, “This time we’re the cattle."…Image, 4/12/20, “It is nearly 20 years since farmers across Wales were forced to cull their livestock in the worst way imaginable," walesonline.co.uk, Anna Lewis…That worst way imaginable being preemptive mass slaughter of millions of healthy farm animals called for by Ferguson’s 2001 models …”The British establishment had its mind set on slaughter” in 2001….A 2006 academic study criticised Neil Ferguson’s 2001 models calling for slaughter of millions of healthy animals as “not fit for purpose.” (page 9) The critique “also described a febrile atmosphere [in 2001]–reminiscent of recent weeks [in 2020]– and claimed that this allowed [government selected] mathematical modellers to shape government policy.”... “It was carnage by computer.” (9, 84). This graphically exemplifies the isolation and abstraction of ‘armchair epidemiology’,” (75)…19 years later in 2020, a few words from math Professor Ferguson and billions of healthy humans are locked down indefinitely, likely for 18+ months: 3/16/2020: UK math professor Neil Ferguson, lead author of the UK study, “said in an interview that his group had shared their projections with the [Trump] White House task force about a week ago and that an early copy of the report was sent over the weekend….“We don’t have a clear exit strategy,” Dr. Ferguson said of the recommended measures. “We’re going to have to suppress this virus–frankly, indefinitely–until we have a vaccine” which could take 18 months…The authors also recommended measures to distance the entire population, such as school closures.”...NY Times, “White House Takes New Line After Dire Report on Death Toll”
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8/11/21, “Planned Euthanasia Does Not Constitute Healthcare – No Matter How Hard You Clap For It," Off Guardian, Iain Davis
“In April and June of 2020 I wrote about something I referred to as LOKIN 20. In a series of articles I was among those in the so called “alternative media” who tried to highlight that lockdowns and other response measures, created by the Coronavirus Act, increased the risks to the most vulnerable.”…
[The Coronavirus Act was approved by the Queen on March 25, 2020 by Royal Assent.…Before that: “The Health Protection (Coronavirus) Regulations 2020 were laid before Parliament on 10 February 2020.…The Government has introduced emergency regulations to prevent the further spread of coronavirus.”]
(continuing): “This was entirely contrary to the rationale we were given for these new laws and subsequent policies. The response was promoted to the public as a “plan” to protect the most vulnerable. It was certainly a plan but increasing, rather than decreasing, the risks appears to have been the objective.
I reported the removal of the safeguards put in place following the Shipman Inquiry and Francis Report (Mid Staffs). I pointed to statistical evidence from the Office of National Statistics and the concerns raised, by people like Professor Carl Heneghan and David Spiegelhalter, that a dangerous withdrawal of healthcare was contributing toward unnecessary increased mortality among the most vulnerable.
I am not claiming any great insight or deductive powers. I was just one, among many others, in the inappropriately named alternative media who were reporting the obvious dangers inherent to government policy.
It is important to stress that the increased mortality risk from the policies, rather than COVID 19, was abundantly clear at the time. Many people tried to warn the public but they were widely dismissed and labelled as “COVID deniers.”
A year later a number of mainstream media (MSM) articles have emerged confirming, what appears to have been, a policy that would inevitably maximise the risks to the most vulnerable.
As usual, the possibility of deliberate policy intent is never broached in any of these MSM pieces. Their reports uncritically cite statements by politicians and consistently assume that these policies were mistakes and promote the notion that lessons need to be learned.
Speaking in June 2020 about the high risk discharge of 25,000 vulnerable patients into care setting, where they received neither medical care nor adequate social care, the former Health Secretary and chairman of the Health Select Committee, Jeremy Hunt, was unquestioningly reported as saying:
“It seems extraordinary that no one appeared to consider the clinical risk to care homes despite widespread knowledge that the virus could be carried asymptomatically.”
Leaving aside the clear scientific proof that there is no such thing as asymptomatic transmission of SARS-CoV-2, the evidence suggests that these were neither mistakes nor failures. Yet all we see from the mainstream media is a free pass for the politicians and a blanket refusal to ever question their deceitful statements.
We face a huge sociopolitical problem. Despite the mountain of historical and contemporaneous evidence that governments can and do intentionally harm us, it seems we are collectively incapable of grasping the reality of democide.
[Democide: “The killing of members of a country’s civilian population as a result of its government’s policy, including by direct action, indifference, and neglect."…"Democide, as the name implies, does not happen in the dark of night without any awareness of it in the country where it occurs.”]
We wrongly assume that every policy is intentionally benign.
We must overcome this flawed and naive belief. Until we recognise that there are those within government, and its wider partnership networks, that wish us ill we will remain unable to address the threat they pose to all of us
The [UK] Coronavirus Act
The UK government not only created the legislation to enable healthcare providers to increase the risks to the most vulnerable, they fully understood those risks. They had previously identified them in training exercises and had extensively modelled those risks.
Contrary to Hunt’s statement, there were many in the UK government who did “consider the clinical risk to care homes.” When the claimed pandemic arrived, rather than respond to limit and reduce the known dangers, the government, of which Hunt is a leading member, appeared to intentionally exacerbate them.
Section 14 of the Coronavirus Act removed the crucial NHS obligations under the NHS (standards) Framework. The NHS did not have to comply with clause 21(2)(a) and 21(12) of the 2012 Regulations.
The NHS no longer had a duty to assess a patient’s “eligibility for NHS Continuing Healthcare” before discharging them. In addition, no relevant body needed to have any “regard to the National Framework.” It is important to recognise what this meant within the context of a supposed global pandemic.
On 19th March 2020 the HCID group of Public Health England and the Advisory Committee on Dangerous Pathogens (ACDP) unanimously agreed to downgrade COVID 19, from a High Consequence Infectious Disease,
The UK government issued instructions to the NHS that they must discharge as many patients as possible on the same day.
With no duty to assess a patient’s continuing healthcare needs, the government set very unsafe assessment criteria and compelled hospitals to discharge them. Unless they were in intensive care, receiving oxygen, on intravenous fluids or imminently close to death, the government decreed:
“Every patient on every general ward should be reviewed on a twice-daily board round to determine the following. If the answer to each question is ‘no’, active consideration for discharge to a less acute setting must be made.”
This is worth reiterating. During an allegedly unprecedented health crisis the UK government removed the NHS duty to assess a patient’s health status (and conditions) before discharging them from hospital. They then issued instructions compelling the NHS to discharge as many patients as possible.
The government and the NHS accepted that this would mean discharging patients with an active COVID 19 infection into the community. COVID patients, and people with a range of potentially life-threatening conditions, were shipped into care settings where other vulnerable adults, who may not not have had any infection, were supposedly “shielding.”
There is no doubt that untested and COVID 19 positive patients entered the care system via this route. Both during the first and second “waves.” It is entirely reasonable to suspect that this policy, combined with others we are about to discuss, caused the said “waves.”
An August 2020 study by the Queen’s Nursing Institute found the following practices commonly operating in Care Homes during the spring 2020 outbreak. We should note the element of compulsion:
“Having to accept patients from hospitals with unknown Covid-19 status, being told about plans not to resuscitate residents without consulting families, residents or care home staff…..21% of respondents said that their home accepted people discharged from hospital who had tested positive for Covid-19…..a substantial number found it difficult to access District Nursing and GP services….25% in total reporting it somewhat difficult or very difficult during March-May 2020.”
On January 11th 2021, during the alleged second wave, The Care Quality Commission stated:
“These settings are admitting people who are discharged from hospital with a COVID-positive test who will be moving or going back into a care home setting.”
Even a few isolated voices in the mainstream media pointed out what they referred to as culpable neglect. Some of the UK’s leading charities for vulnerable people including the Alzheimer’s Society, Marie Curie, Age UK, Care England and Independent Age contributed toward an open letter to the UK government. Written on 14th April 2020 they highlighted a litany of policy “failures:”
“Instead of being allowed hospital care, to see their loved ones and to have the reassurance that testing allows; and for the staff who care for them to have even the most basic of PPE, they are told they cannot go to hospital, routinely asked to sign Do Not Resuscitate orders.”
The policies operated both by the NHS and the care homes, as a consequence of Coronavirus Act’s “legislative easement,” did not protect the most vulnerable. Rather they maximised their clinical risk. Not just of COVID 19, but of every condition that rendered them vulnerable in the first place.
From the 17th March 2020 the NHS were discharging vulnerable patients into care homes without assessing their “eligibility for healthcare.” On 2nd April 2020 the NHS combined this with instructions that care home residents should not be conveyed to hospital. On the 6th April they issued guidance to GP’s which stated:
“All patients should be triaged remotely. Remote consultations should be used when possible. Consider the use of video consultations when appropriate.”
So-called “first wave” mortality peaked on the 11th of April and the UK government published its COVID 19 Action Plan on the 15th April. This seemingly insane policy agenda was deemed “necessary” by the UK state
to create “capacity” in the NHS:
“The UK Government with the NHS set out its plans on the 17th March 2020 to free up NHS capacity via rapid discharge into the community and reducing planned care….We can now confirm we will move to institute a policy of testing all residents prior to admission to care homes.”
There was no commitment to improve the situation from the UK government, just a plan to move toward one. We know from the observations of the CQC that they continued these high risk policies during the subsequent virus “waves.” There is no evidence that any of these policies were designed to reduce the risks of the most vulnerable. They all, consistently tended to increase them.
It is not tenable for politicians to now claim that they didn’t know what was happening. They constructed and enabled all of the policies that made this dangerous negligence possible. Nor is it credible to simply blame the medical profession. The widespread use of Hospital Trust gagging orders (non disclosure agreements) was also in place.
Doctors who did speak out were disciplined or sacked. This was systemic policy initiative which physicians were expected to abide by.
Once the vulnerable were trapped in abandoned care homes, which were knowingly understaffed, the remaining, unprotected staff were then left to deal with both their own safety fears and the mounting mortality. The government decided this was an opportune moment to suspend all safety inspections in both hospital and care settings.
This was supposed to “limit infections,” although every other decision they made appeared to increase them. Yet again, ending inspections raised the mortality risk for the most vulnerable.
At the same time, Do Not Resuscitate (DNAR) notices were being attached to vulnerable people’s care plans, often without their consent or even their knowledge.
This coincided with a massive increase in orders for the potentially life-ending medication midazolam.
Midazolam
In March 2020 the NHS purchased the equivalent of two years worth of supply. French suppliers were then given regulatory approval by the MHRA to sell additional stock to the NHS. This was then distributed for out of hospital use in the community.
This benzodiazepine (midazolam) is a sedative/anaesthetic that suppresses respiration and the central nervous system (CNS). The British National Formula (BNF) recommends its use for sedation of anxious or agitated terminally ill patients using a mechanised syringe pump in doses of 30–200 micrograms/kg/hour. It is not recommended for conscious sedation in higher doses due to the following risks:
“CNS (central nervous system) depression; compromised airway; severe respiratory depression.”
Therefore a frail, eight stone (50 kg) [110 lb] adult could receive an initial dose of up to 2.5mg followed by a total incremental dose of another 2.5mg over a 24hr period. The purpose of this would be to ease their anxiety and agitation if they were experiencing the frightening sensation of intense respiratory difficulty.
Midazolam becomes a conscious anaesthetic for use in intensive and palliative care when given in higher doses. The British Association for Palliative Medicine recommend:
“Start with 2.5-5 milligrams – if necessary, increase progressively to 10 milligrams – maintain with 10-60 milligrams / 24h in a syringe pump”
Ten milligrams is twice the BNF recommended dose to ease anxiety (for an 8 stone vulnerable adult.) Therefore it is extremely concerning that NHS Clinical Guideline for Symptom Control for patients with COVID-19 recommended 10mg of Midazolam for patients with “distressing breathlessness at rest.”This risks a rapid deterioration of the symptoms causing them that distress.
Gosport Scandal
Police are still investigating an estimated 15,000 deaths that occurred at Gosport War Memorial Hospital between 1987 and 2001. An inquiry has already found that at least 456 people’s lives were “shortened” through the unwarranted use of unnecessary medication.
Many suspect that the true figure is in the thousands. The independent panel into the malpractice at Gosport War Memorial Hospital found:
“There was a disregard for human life and a culture of shortening the lives of a large number of patients by prescribing and administering “dangerous doses” of a hazardous combination of medication not clinically indicated or justified…they were, in effect, put on a terminal care pathway…The risk of using them in combination has been consistently documented in the BNF. In particular, it has long been known that when given together, opioids and midazolam cause enhanced sedation, respiratory depression and lowered blood pressure.”
This report was published in September 2018. In 2020 the NHS treatment guidelines for COVID 19 patients, who were deemed to be “agitated,” was:
“Start with Morphine 20mg and Midazolam 20mg”
This is precisely the mechanical syringe combination used at Gosport War Memorial to “shorten” thousands of peoples lives.
There are numerous reasons to suspect that the huge increase in midazolam ordered by the NHS, with the full knowledge of the government, was intended for this purpose.
In April 2020 the Health and Social Care Committee, chaired by Jeremy Hunt, heard submissions from medical professionals as they considered the government response to the global pandemic. In Q377 Dr Luke Evans (MP fror Hinckley and Bosworth) asked then Health Secretary about NHS provisions for “a good death.” This is medical shorthand for assisted dying or euthanasia. Dr Evans (MP) asked:
“The syringe drivers are used to deliver medications such as midazolam and morphine. Do you have any precautions in place to ensure that we have enough of those medications?”
To which Matt Hancock replied:
“Yes. We have a big project to make sure that the global supply chains for those sorts of medications [are] clear. In fact, those medicines are made in a relatively small number of factories around the world, so it is a delicate supply chain and we are in contact with the whole supply chain.”
Hancock was clearly referring to the huge midazolam order and MHRA approval of the French supply chain. The UK government had already passed the Coronavirus Act, removing the NHS Framework duties, and had ordered them to discharge patients en masse. The NHS had instructed care homes not to send sick patients to hospital and GP support from the care homes had effectively been withdrawn.
Jeremy Hunt was chairing this discussion. For him to claim two months later that no one had “appeared to consider the clinical risk to care homes” smacks of vile obfuscation. The best we can say about this statement is that he was wrong. We now have the documentation which shows that the clinical risk in care homes was very carefully considered and the withdrawal of care was planned.
Cygnus
In 2016 the UK government ran Exercise Cygnus. The training scenario was prepared by Professor Neil Ferguson and his team at Imperial College London (ICL). It simulated a flu outbreak and was a Command Post Exercise (CPX) designed to test the UK’s pandemic preparedness. Nearly a thousand key officials took part from central and local government departments, the NHS, public health bodies from across UK, as well as local emergency response planners.
[A similar “pandemic rehearsal” took place in the US in Oct. 2019: “Event 201: The Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security in partnership with the World Economic Forum and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation hosted Event 201, a high-level pandemic exercise on October 18, 2019, in New York, NY. The exercise illustrated areas where public/private partnerships will be necessary during the response to a severe pandemic in order to diminish large-scale economic and societal consequences.“]
(continuing): “Some of the Cygnus Report recommendations were implemented in response to COVID 19 and others not. For example, it recommended legislative easements.
The Coronavirus Act certainly eased the legislation surrounding the death registration process and the NHS duty of care. The legal requirements for inquests, post-mortems and cremations were also relaxed.
Exercise Cygnus also highlighted a number of deficiencies. It identified inadequate numbers of critical, general and acute care beds, which the government then proceeded to reduce further; it warned that whole sections of the NHS may have to be shut, which is exactly what the government did during the “pandemic;” it highlighted that the most vulnerable could be denied care, just as they were, and that the health service would have to be set on a war footing just to be able to cope.
These were warnings not policy suggestions. The UK government’s adoption of some of the Cygnus recommendations and determination not to address Cygnus alarms appears to have been their policy response to COVID 19.
COVID 19 healthcare strategies were seemingly set in 2016. The Cygnus scenario, modelled by Ferguson and ICL differed from their COVID 19 “models” only by virtue of being based upon influenza rather than a coronavirus.
Perhaps this explains why Exercise Cygnus was kept secret, reportedly for reasons of “national security.” When the report was released, after being exposed, it was heavily redacted and all the names of the senior officials involved were hidden.
The official explanation for this is that it was just too terrifying for the public to withstand. We might ask, terrifying for whom? Using the media to terrorise the public during the alleged pandemic was recommended by Spi-B (SAGE.)
It is reasonable to assume that many of those redacted names would have been people working for Ferguson’s ICL team and current members of SAGE. If so, this indicates that those involved in planning the response to COVID 19 not only understood what the risks were, they then provided the claimed “scientific” justification for policies which they knew would increase them.
One of the senior officials involved in Cygnus reportedly said:
“These exercises are supposed to prepare government for something like this – but it appears they were aware of the problem but didn’t do much about it.”
Again, we see the assumption that everything must be explained away as error or unfortunate oversight. This stretches credibility beyond breaking point when we understand that Cygnus ultimately produced a plan to deny healthcare during a pandemic. This policy of increasing the risks of the most vulnerable was evidently operating during the first alleged pandemic wave. It also seems likely that it continued beyond that point.
Based upon the Cygnus conclusions, in September 2017, the NHS Surge and Triage briefing paper was made available to senior health and government officials. It discussed something
called population triage:
“The purpose of this paper is to provide an update to Chief Medical Officer (CMO) and the Chief Scientific Advisor (CSA) on continuing refinement of the knowledge and understanding behind the potential decision that may be required in a future extreme pandemic influenza scenario to move to
a state of population triage across the country…”
Population triage
means the potential denial of healthcare:
“The majority of the detail in this paper will not be replicated in any publicly available documentation…Difficult decisions will be needed about maintaining patient access to care…There is significant discussion in the paper about ceasing or changing care to patients in the HRG (Healthcare Resource Groups)…Patients would be assessed on probability of survival rather than clinical need and higher level services would no longer be provided…Total excess death rate would be in excess of 7,806 per week of the peak of the pandemic if all these services were stopped…So in the peak six weeks of a pandemic…46,836 excess deaths could be expected”
Between 7th March and 8th May 2020, there were 47,243 excess deaths in England and Wales. According to the Cygnus predictions, this was slightly higher than the numbers envisaged
to result directly from the
withdrawal of healthcare.
However, nearly all of these deaths were attributed to COVID 19. We should ask where, in the claimed COVID 19 mortality figures, the anticipated deaths from the denial of healthcare are.
In November 2017 a number of English stakeholders also met to discuss the a pandemic briefing paper for Adult Social and Community Care. This too was a product of Exercise Cygnus. Once again the intention was to keep the report secret.
“The majority of the detail in this paper will not be replicated in any publicly available documentation.. Whilst demand will increase, capacity, which is already under pressure because of recruitment challenges, will also reduce because of staff absences.. Adult social care will have an increased role in supporting rapid discharge from hospital. In a severe pandemic, only those services that are life-critical will be maintained.. More patients could be supported by a greater focus on telecare/tele-monitoring.”
It is known, from the reports of the CQC and national charities and other NHS documents cited in this article, that primary healthcare was withdrawn from care settings and the community. The staff shortages identified in 2016 became chronic and then severe during the pandemic. This was entirely predictable and was a known outcome of the track and trace and self-isolation polices of the UK government.
The briefing paper spoke about which services could be “reduced or deferred.” Crucially these included assessment of care needs, mobility support, personal care support, maintaining family connections and access to medical treatment.
During the “first wave” approximately 25,000 vulnerable people were discharged into care homes to face the extremely high risk environment created for them by the UK government. At the same time potentially life ending drugs were being liberally prescribed.
This was the COVID 19 policy response and we were told the intention was to “protect the most vulnerable”. All of it was predicted on the assumption that hospital were struggling to cope with the “surge” in COVID 19 patients. According to the UK government, patients needed to be discharged to free up capacity in the NHS.
At the height of the so called first wave, on the 13th of April 2020, the Health Service Journal reported that hospital bed occupancy was at a record low, with 4 times more beds available that usual for the time of year. There were 37,500 available beds.
The HSJ stated that the reason for this spare capacity was the discharge policy operated by NHS at the behest of the government. What they didn’t mention is that these figures show the high-risk discharge of the most vulnerable people in our society was entirely unnecessary.
You may not like it but it is not “unthinkable” that this was deliberate, coordinated policy designed to increase the mortality statistics. Many have questioned the claimed severity of the alleged pandemic. If you wish to give the impression of a high mortality disease then you need the deaths to back up your claim.
It is feasible that all of these risk heightening factors happened to perfectly coalesce to increase mortality, but is it plausible? A refusal to contemplate the possibility of an intentional act does not rule it out. Only a thorough, truly independent investigation can.
Conclusion
While this system was in operation, the UK government encouraged widespread adoption of the Clap for Carers, often referred to as “clap for the NHS.” During lockdowns, as the whole nation was told to self isolate indoors and avoid all unnecessary congregation, between the 26th March and the 28th May, we were “allowed” to simultaneously congregate on the streets and show our appreciation by clapping, banging pots and pans and ringing bells.
Meanwhile vulnerable people were being discharged into unsafe care homes where access to medical care was withdrawn and essential social care removed.
Clapping for this was obscene.
The government clearly used this ploy both as a distraction and as propaganda. This does not suggest that doctors, nurses and carers do not deserve our support. Any medical professional or carer who blows the whistle is almost certainly making a career ending decision.
Given the evidence we have discussed, if we consider ourselves to be responsible citizens who live in a democracy, it is unconscionable for us to simply ignore what appears to have been a deliberate and illegal government policy of large scale euthanasia in the UK.
We must seek answers from policymakers and malfeasance in office must be prosecuted wherever it is identified.”
……..
“You can read more of Iain’s work at his blog In This Together or on UK Column or follow him on Twitter. His new book Pseudopandemic, is now available, in both in kindle and paperback, from Amazon and other sellers. Or you can claim a free copy by subscribing to his newsletter.”
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Added: More on Neil Ferguson’s 2001 sloppy math that was used as an excuse to preemptively slaughter millions of healthy farm animals….“The British establishment had its mind set on slaughter” in 2001:
The Queen was so delighted with Ferguson’s 2001 computer models ordering brutal slaughter of millions of healthy farm animals that in 2002 she awarded him an OBE, Order of the British Empire.
Page 6: “The disparity between the course of the 2001 epidemic and the model predictions demands an explanation. The numerical output of models has an air of intellectual superiority…Numbers can ‘reassure by appearing to extend control, precision and knowledge beyond their real limits…(11), may convey an illusion of certainty and security that is not warranted (43);…A model constitutes a theory, and a predictive model is therefore only a theoretical projection.”…“Appropriateness of model use in 2001,“...”The 2001 predictive models were constructed in an environment of poor-quality data (e.g. they used out-of-date census data for stock levels), and poor
epidemiological knowledge (e.g. the transmission characteristics of the virus strain, and the distribution of the initially infected farms, were unknown). Therefore, their use as predictive tools was inappropriate….Page 9: “The model that Ferguson et al. (31) presented to the Science Group in late March probably had the most influence on early policy decisions (93), specifically, the introduction of the pre-emptive contiguous culling policy. However, this model, and the Keeling et al. model (56) that was used to corroborate it, were assigned parameters that could not help but favour that policy, based on field tracing data that should have been viewed with caution. The models were highly sensitive to the accuracy of this information, in
that these data determined the degree of disease transmission to be
simulated before clinical signs and the distance over which the majority
of transmission took place. Despite the fact that the modellers seemed to be aware of these issues, the models were used as strong support for the implementation of the contiguous cull. The authors of this paper argue that the models were not fit for the purpose of predicting the course of the epidemic and the effects of control measures. The models also remain unvalidated. Their use in predicting the effects of control strategies was therefore imprudent. In retrospect, very little of value was added to the FMD control policy by the use of predictive models. The latter therefore failed the most pragmatic ‘litmus test’: namely, usefulness (40; Hugh-Jones, quoted by 79). The key question for any model is whether decisions made with it are more correct than those made without it (17). However,
the consequences of following the recommendations of these models were
severe: economically, in terms of cost to the country; socially, in
terms of misery and even suicides among those involved in the slaughter
programme; and scientifically, in the abuse of predictive models, and their possible ultimate adverse effects on disease control policy in the future (see below).”…In either case, the value of the facts must be judged, and scientific
experts must be accountable, not only to government ministers but also
to other experts. To date, this has not occurred in the context of the
2001 epidemic....The use of models during epidemics should be restricted to monitoring the epidemic and aiding short-term fine adjustments to strategies…. ‘The progress of an outbreak of FMD is extremely difficult to predict in the early stages of the disease. The course of an outbreak can be critically affected by minor and inherently unpredictable events, such as a single livestock movement. For this reason, predictive disease models, which depend on statistical probabilities of transmission, have not met with much success in predicting the spread of FMD from herd to herd, and still less the impact of control measures.”…
Neil Ferguson is employed as a professor of mathematical biology. Neil Ferguson has no degree in biology or any life science. He has a 1990 BA in Physics, and a 1994 PhD in theoretical physics, per Wikipedia.
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